By Ray Anthony Roxas-Chua III
Chairman of the Commission on Information and Communications Technology

I feel exhausted and rejuvenated at the same time.

I had just come from a meeting at the Commission on Elections (Comelec), where I led the Advisory Council in convincing the Comelec en banc that fake ballots in the upcoming 2010 National and Local elections should be rejected by the automated election system (AES), instead of being accepted and diverted into a separate compartment inside the ballot box.

It was not the first time we had this discussion with the Comelec. In fact, we had already twice given our position on the matter to the Comelec in the form of resolutions and even presented our case to the Comelec en banc on a prior occasion. Despite our previous efforts, it appeared the Comelec needed more convincing, and we were more than happy to oblige.

Just like we did the first time, we presented point-by-point to the Comelec en banc why fake ballots should not be accepted by the AES and diverted to a separate compartment in the ballot box:

* It will be difficult for the voter to determine whether or not his/her ballot was treated as fake. Since the ballot is accepted regardless of authenticity, the voter may mistakenly assume his/her ballot was counted even though it was actually diverted to the “fake” compartment.
* Perpetrators may hand out fake ballots to unknowing voters, who will think they are getting real ballots since the AES accepts them. These perpetrators may then set aside the real ballots for their own purposes.
* Letting the AES determine ballot authenticity away from the voter’s view can facilitate automated cheating that circumvents the manual audit. If real ballots are diverted, erroneously or on purpose, to the “fake” compartment, this will not be exposed by the manual audit, since only the ballots in the “real” compartment will be used for the audit.
* If the AES happens to misread the ballot as fake, it will automatically be diverted to the “fake” compartment and there will be no opportunity to try again.
* A visible rejection of fake ballots will act as a deterrent. If perpetrators know that fake ballots will be rejected outright in plain sight, they will be discouraged from bringing such ballots to the precinct in the first place.

We waited nervously while the Comelec en banc deliberated on what we had just presented. We were deeply concerned, because even though the treatment of fake ballots was one small detail of the AES, it had the potential to compromise the integrity of the entire election automation exercise. When the Comelec en banc finally decided to accept our recommendation, I heaved a sigh of relief.

As I stepped out of the Comelec head office at the historic Palacio del Gobernador, I pondered the increasingly complex role of the Advisory Council.

The Advisory Council was created by Republic Act No. 9369 to provide advice to the Comelec on election automation matters, including the selection of the technology, the procurement of the system and the implementation of the project. It includes representatives from the government, academe, IT professional organizations and non-governmental organizations.

Since the Advisory Council’s mandate is to provide advice to the Comelec, our role appears to be straightforward—we are merely advisors. The Comelec still has the final say on election automation matters and is free to accept or decline our recommendations as it deems appropriate. When the Comelec decides to only partially adopt or disregard our advice, we usually respect its decision and remain silent.

However, given the consequences of a failed election automation exercise, it may no longer be sufficient for the Advisory Council to passively dispense advice. There are instances where we have to be more vocal about our position, especially when the integrity of the elections is at stake. The rejection of fake ballots is just one example, and, with many outstanding issues to be decided before election day, it will probably not be the last.

With only a couple of months remaining before the May 2010 elections, the challenges facing the Comelec and the Advisory Council continue to grow. Getting the Comelec to agree with our recommendation on the rejection of fake ballots will not guarantee the successful automation of the 2010 elections, but it is one of the many small interventions we have to make to help ensure clean, honest and orderly elections.
Sometimes little things can make all the difference.

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